About event:

This November, Geir Godager from the University of Oslo will deliver two guest lectures at the Kyiv School of Economics. The lectures provide an introduction to the basic theory of economic incentives in payment schemes for healthcare providers, such as primary care physicians and hospitals.
The lectures employ a Principal-Agent Model to explore the dynamics between regulators and healthcare providers. In this framework, a regulator is tasked with designing a payment scheme. Subsequently, healthcare providers, who possess superior information, respond to the payment scheme when choosing medical treatments for their patients. The lectures will analyze these interactions and examine the properties of fixed payment, fee-for-service, and mixed payment schemes as policy measures.

Lecture 1:

Introduction to study setting and challenges. Objectives for regulator, patients and providers. Key challenges with fixed payment and fee-for-service payment. Linear cost function.

Lecture 2:

Asymmetric information. Convex cost function. Heterogeneous patients. Mixed payment. Choice of policy measure. Summary and discussion.

Speaker:

Geir Godager is a professor of health economics at the University of Oslo in Norway. His research focuses on decision-making processes in healthcare services and the impact of both monetary and non-monetary incentives on the choices of patients and healthcare professionals. He is particularly interested in the origins of imperfectly rational behavior and developing methods to quantify decision-making quality. 
Godager frequently employs discrete choice models in his work. His recent research analyzes equilibrium behavior in experimental healthcare markets using Quantal Response Equilibrium Choice (QREC) models. He conducts both lab and field experiments in collaboration with partners worldwide. Additionally, Godager holds a researcher position at Akershus University Hospital. He also serves as an Associate Editor of Health Economics.

Language of communication:

English