Join the seminar “Self-Equivalent Voting Rules,” which is part of the General Economics Seminar Series

The seminar will be delivered by Héctor Hermida Rivera, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Quantitative Social & Management Sciences Research Centre (QSMS) at the Budapest University of Technology & Economics (BME).

Hermida Rivera Héctor introduces a novel stability axiom for stochastic voting rules, called self-equivalence, by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself will choose not to do so. He then shows that under the unrestricted strict preference domain, the unique voting rule satisfying the democratic principles of anonymity, optimality, monotonicity, and neutrality as well as the stability principle of self-equivalence must assign to every voter equal probability of being a dictator (i.e., uniform random dictatorship). Thus, any society that desires stability and adheres to the aforementioned democratic principles is bound to either employ the uniform random dictatorship or decide whether to change its voting rule using a voting rule other than itself.

The seminar will take place online via Zoom on Friday, January 23, from 5:00 to 6:00 PM.You can join the event using this link. 

We look forward to welcoming you to the seminar.